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1 Introduction
China and Brazil have established a significant
presence in trade, investment and international
development cooperation in Ghana. Both uphold
a framework of South–South cooperation based
on respect for national sovereignty and national
interests, non-intervention, no imposition of
conditionalities, and commonalities based on
histories as colonised nations, or in the case of
Brazil on cultural affinities (see Amanor, this
IDS Bulletin). However, the engagements in
Ghana are conditioned by the processes of
market liberalisation restructuring during the
1990s and 2000s undergone in all three
countries. These reforms have considerably
transformed them, opened them to new forms of
investment and capital accumulation and led to
new trajectories of foreign investment that
transforms their relationship with Ghana.
Engagements by China and Brazil in Ghana
therefore need to be examined within the
context of the rise of global agri-business, and
government support for agri-business expansion
in Ghana. These recent developments in turn
must be placed within a long-term framework of
the changing agrarian political economy and the
impact of economic liberalisation on the
Ghanaian agricultural economy. 
2 China and Brazil in Ghana
Ghana is an important African country for both
China and Brazil. This is reflected in the high-
level institutions for development cooperation
placed in Ghana. These occur in a nation that
has been subject to considerable aid and
interventions to reform the institutional
framework of economic administration by donors
since the early 1980s, when Ghana became the
first African country to implement a structural
adjustment programme. China has established
the West Africa regional office of CADFund
(China–Africa Development Fund) in Accra to
facilitate Chinese investment in West Africa.
Brazil also established an office of the Brazilian
Agricultural Research Corporation (Embrapa) in
Accra, initially aimed at a regional coordination
role (see Cabral et al., this IDS Bulletin).
Economic relations between Ghana and China
are marked by the large long-term loans for the
development of infrastructure. This takes place
within the context of the recent development of
the oil industry in Ghana, and Chinese interests
in oil. These oil resources have been used to
underwrite and justify the loans. Ghana has
recently signed two concessionary loan
agreements with China Exim Bank to the value
of over US$13 billion.1
Trade between Ghana and China has expanded
rapidly and China has emerged as Ghana’s
second largest trade partner after the EU, with
bilateral trade reaching around US$2 billion in
recent years. However, this trade is weighted in
favour of China, with China showing a
favourable trade balance. Ghana’s trade deficit
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with China grew from US$70.3 million in 2000 to
US$474.3 million in 2006 (ACET 2009). Trade
follows the classical core periphery structure,
with Chinese imports to Ghana dominated by
manufactured goods, and Ghanaian exports
dominated by primary agricultural commodities
and raw materials (Tsikata et al. 2008). Beyond
this, China sponsors many small projects
contributing to the cultural life of Ghana in the
fields of communication and culture, such as
building a national cultural centre (Tsikata et al.
2008; Idun-Arkhurst 2008).
The main areas of economic cooperation between
China and Ghana include infrastructure, energy,
communications, agriculture, trade, and
education and training. In agriculture, exchanges
have been facilitated in the areas of irrigation,
agroprocessing, agricultural technology and
infrastructure development. Chinese investments
in the agricultural sector are quite small,
constituting about 4 per cent of total investments
(ACET 2009). Until 2006 they constituted about
US$10.4 million, of which the largest share has
been spent on irrigation projects at Nobewam and
Afefe. The Chinese government has also
sponsored Chinese volunteers to teach agriculture
at the University of Ghana (ACET 2009).
Brazilian investments within the Ghanaian
economy are dwarfed by China. However,
Brazilian investments largely focus on the
agricultural sector, and in this sector they make a
very significant contribution. The most
important programme is the extension of the
More Food programme from Brazil to Ghana,
which provides loans of US$98 million for the
acquisition of Brazilian agricultural technology
by Ghanaian farmers. The More Food
programme is grounded within a commitment to
inclusive development, smallholder family
farming, and poverty alleviation, linked to social
protection policies related to school feeding
programmes and conditional cash transfers to
poor families for child schooling (see Cabral et
al., this IDS Bulletin). Private sector investments
are also increasingly becoming significant within
the agriculture-related sector, including
investments in agroprocessing. This includes a
US$300 million loan from the government of
Brazil to Northern Sugar to build a sugar cane
complex for the production of ethanol, with an
ethanol plant to be built by Constran S/A of
Brazil, a recent but as yet undisclosed contract to
establish a cashew processing plant, an
investment of US$300 million by Dos Branco
group in a biscuit and pasta processing plant,
and investments of Brazilian companies in rice
production. 
In contrast with the China–Ghana trade, which
concentrates on manufactured goods and raw
materials, trade between Ghana and Brazil
focuses much more on agricultural produce –
reflecting the centrality of agri-business to the
Brazilian economy. In 2011, Ghana’s total
imports from Brazil were worth US$282 million,
of which sugar accounted for US$137 million and
meat products for US$57 million. Exports from
Ghana to Brazil were worth US$29 million,
US$27.5 million of which was from fruits and
nuts while cocoa products accounted for
US$0.8 million.2 Thus, trade between Brazil and
Ghana is limited by the reliance of the two
economies on agricultural products and the
terms of trade between Brazil and Ghana are
highly distorted in favour of Brazil.
In articulating a framework of Southern solidarity
with Africa, the government of Brazil draws upon
symbols of cultural similarity, the existence of a
large African diaspora in Brazil, the commonalities
of a history rooted in the slave trade and the
similarities of the environment. In terms of
cultural exchange in Ghana, the Brazilian embassy
has been instrumental in developing cultural ties,
such as supporting a carnival in Accra in February.
The Brazilian government has also supported the
rehabilitation of Brazil House in Accra, one of the
oldest houses in Accra established by the Tabon, an
originally Islamic community of repatriated freed
Brazilian slaves who chose to resettle in Accra
during the nineteenth century, although they
traced their origins to Mali.
However, these cultural links do little to deepen
cultural exchange between Brazilians and
Ghanaians, or build cultural familiarities and
modes for communication. Although there is
great interest in Africa among Afro-Brazilians,
there is little Brazilian government support to
encourage exchange visits or to deepen African
studies within Brazil. As a consequence, while
Brazil provides generous support for African
students to study agricultural subjects in
Brazilian universities, few Ghanaian students
take up these opportunities, since they are
conditional upon them being fluent in
IDS Bulletin Volume 44  Number 4  July 2013 81
2 Cabral IDSB44.4.qxd  18/06/2013  14:49  Page 81
Portuguese, and few opportunities exist as yet
for them to acquire proficiency in this language. 
In contrast, China articulates its Southern
solidarity in terms of its long-term history of
economic cooperation in Ghana dating back to the
Nkrumah period, when over 200 Chinese
technicians and diplomatic staff were located in
Ghana. It also stresses the diplomatic support
Ghana has given to China in its bid for a
permanent seat in the UN and its support for the
One China Policy in international relations (not
officially recognising Taiwan), and the common
framework of developing country interests that
both nations have upheld internationally (Idun-
Arkhurst 2008). The Chinese government has
supported the development of Chinese language
studies at the University of Ghana and facilitated
the studies of many Ghanaians in China. Within
China, African Studies programmes are being
developed and African lecturers recruited. Beyond
this, since the 1980s many Chinese nationals have
been working in diverse occupations within Ghana,
including road construction, informal sector gold
mining and agriculture, building up familiarity
with Ghanaian conditions. Many Ghanaian traders
visit China to purchase goods and the Chinese
embassy also provides information on trading in
China for them. Thus there is a multisector
acquisition of cultural knowledge by citizens of the
two countries. The existence of large numbers of
Chinese working within Ghana and in rural areas
sometimes leads to conflicts between communities
and cultural misconceptions, which require that
both governments work towards better cultural
understandings and education of citizens of both
nations on cultural relations and economic
opportunities and towards more openness in
informing citizens on economic policies (Tsikata et
al. 2008).
3 Agrarian development in Ghana: the historical
context for new engagements
Ghana’s agricultural sector has been considerably
transformed in recent years by the imposition of
structural adjustment policies and movements of
international agri-business into Ghana. These
developments have been uneven in that foreign
capital has tended to invest in a limited number
of favourable sectors, usually concerned with
export crops, while service provisioning to staple
food sectors has stagnated. Ghanaian agricultural
policy has also moved from an emphasis on
developing agri-industrial linkages with a
strategy of state-led import substitution growth
to a policy of export-oriented production, agri-
business promotion and food value chain
development through market governance. 
This has created potential openings for the
Brazilian strategy of promoting the
internationalisation of Brazilian agri-business.
Thus, the Chinese and Brazilian engagements in
the agricultural sector in Ghana must be
understood in relation to these wider
interactions – economic, cultural and political –
over time, as well as the wider historical framing
of such engagements in Africa (see Amanor, this
IDS Bulletin). 
During the early independence phase the radical
Convention People’s Party government led by
Nkrumah continued to develop large-scale state
investments in agriculture within a political
ideology of African Socialism. The cocoa sector
continued to be dominated by smallholder
production, with the state controlling marketing
through a Cocoa Marketing Board, which was
established in the colonial period. Within the
food sector the government carried out a policy
of promoting agriprocessing within a framework
of import substitution industrialisation, in which
state farms, Workers’ Brigades and farmer
cooperatives were promoted. State farms also
drew upon Soviet and Chinese technical support
and equipment (Konings 1986).
The 1966 coup against Nkrumah brought pro-
Commonwealth and pro-US interests to the fore.
The agricultural sector was reorganised to support
the development of private capitalist estate
agriculture and the creation of a new extension
service in tune with the US model based on the
Land Grant system. Following the 1972 coup
agricultural policy reverted to a more mixed
approach, combining state farms with promotion
of capitalist agriculture. The major focus of policy
was on developing commercial rice farming in the
north. Military personnel and close allies of the
regime invested in large rice estates, gaining
access to cheap loans and subsidised inputs
(Shepherd and Onumah 1997; Konings 1986).
In the mid-1970s the government redirected its
agricultural policy away from nurturing a
domestic class of capitalist farmers towards a
contract farmer model based on capturing
peasant farmers, in line with recommendations
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of the World Bank. This was incorporated on
irrigation projects producing rice and vegetables
and in nucleus estate outgrower models in the oil
palm sector in the south (Amanor 2000; Daddieh
1994; Konings 1986). 
These developments failed to save the regime
from the mounting economic crisis and
bankruptcy, which resulted in another coup that
brought Jerry Rawlings to power. In 1982, after
attempting to court support from Eastern
European states, the Provisional National
Defence Council (PNDC) went to the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and
accepted a structural adjustment programme,
which has involved privatisation of state-owned
enterprises (SOEs) and the introduction of a
system of parliamentary democracy.
This has had considerable impact on the
agricultural sector, including removal of
subsidies on inputs and agricultural services, and
the privatisation of agricultural services. During
the 1980s and 1990s Western donors reinforced
this process of privatisation by supporting the
activities of NGOs to fill in gaps in agricultural
service provisioning.
From the late 1990s Ghanaian agricultural policy
has been dominated by two concerns. The first is
ensuring that agricultural policy documents
reflect the issue of poverty reduction and the
Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy, and that
differentiated strategies are devised to meet the
needs of different categories of farmers. The
second concern relates to commitment to the
development of agri-business through promoting
increased productivity in the value chain and
market governance of food chains (MOFA 2007).
Beyond the rhetoric of pro-poor market
approaches, the process of privatising agriculture
has had an ambiguous impact on agrarian
developments. While Western donors have
insisted on privatisation from a neoliberal
ideological perspective and have refused to fund
state agricultural services, the private sector has
been reluctant to invest comprehensively. Thus,
the privatisation of the state seed sector has
found no private sector buyers, and this has
resulted in a significant decline in modern seed
production (Amanor 2010). Similarly, Ghana’s
irrigation projects lie largely idle, with the
exception of those rehabilitated by China, as a
result of donor reluctance to invest in state-
controlled assets. 
As a consequence, agricultural development has
been uneven, with the private sector cherry
picking the most profitable sectors and donors
pumping funds into the most promising
commercial export sectors. During the 1990s,
food crop production became neglected as most
funds went into the development of new
horticultural crops for the export trade.
Multinational companies moved into the oil palm
sector, while the cocoa processing sector has been
characterised by concentration, and is dominated
by three companies: Cargill, ADM and Barry
Callebaut. There is a pronounced tendency for
Western multinationals to move out of farm
production into control of the food chain. For
example, Unilever has sold off its oil palm
plantation to Wilmar of Singapore, the largest
Asian processor of palm oil. 
Agri-business companies prefer to work in
coalitions of partners, providing various services
to farmers and controlling production through
food chain governance, standards control,
tracking of farm production and contracts with
various intermediaries and farmers. NGOs play a
significant role in these coalitions, in recruiting
farmers into agri-business chains and providing
them with training to produce commodities
according to preset standards (Amanor 2010).
The Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa
(AGRA), funded by the Gates Foundation, has
also been instrumental in promoting the
development of agricultural input markets. As
donor funding for NGOs has shrunk, many of
them are now soliciting funds from the private
sector to recruit farmers to participate in agri-
business chains. USAID supports a large network
of international NGOs providing business
services to farmers. Equally, the Millennium
Development Authority, which implements the
US$547 million US Millennium Challenge
Compact, has also contributed to building up
infrastructure that supports commercial
development of food crop production.3 
During the late 1990s and early 2000s these
developments were most significant within the
horticultural sector. Since the 2006–08 world food
crisis, which resulted in significant price rises in
staples, there has been a renewed interest in
commercial production of staples for domestic
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and international markets. Rice has been
identified by both government and donors as a
commodity with much potential for increased
production. Many companies prefer to work with
smallholder contract farmers rather than
establish large estates, since land tenure security
is considered a major problem in Ghana given the
large number of land disputes, and since large-
scale land acquisitions attract unfavourable or
unwanted international attention.
The policy environment in Ghana today is
therefore one that favours agri-business and
international investments, but one in which agri-
business developments have been patchy and
hesitant given the lack of development of more
comprehensive transport and research
infrastructures and the difficulties of acquiring
large tracts of land. It is into this context that
new investments from China and Brazil enter.
4 Chinese investments in the agricultural sector
Chinese investments in Ghanaian agriculture
have been limited but significant. The most
significant investments have been in irrigation
plants at Afife and Nobewam. The Afife Project
(or Weta project as it has come to be recently
renamed following a dispute over the rightful
land ownership between the chiefs of Weta and
Afife), occupies an area of 880 acres. It is
currently the largest irrigated rice-growing
project in Ghana. While the Afife irrigation
infrastructure originated from the 1960s and the
1980s, when it was overhauled and rehabilitated
by Chinese technicians, it is presently
undergoing further expansion through a Chinese
project. Chinese technical cooperation is also
looking for other areas in the Volta Region in
which to expand irrigation works. 
China has considerable skills in rice cultivation
and hybrid rice seed production – including
cutting edge research which has sequenced the
rice genome. The main development
interventions within Ghana at present focus on
the enhancement and expansion of irrigation
facilities. Although in the 1980s technical advice
was provided by Chinese experts to the Ministry
of Food and Agriculture (MOFA) on appropriate
cultivation methods, this is no longer a priority.
MOFA is responsible for management and
extension once the infrastructure is completed.
The Chinese government’s main role is the
provision of irrigation infrastructure. 
A second area of recent investment is in input
supplies, with Chinese companies providing both
fertilisers and agrochemicals. The waste disposal
company, Zoom Lion, which is owned by both
Ghanaian and Chinese interests, has recently
established a fertiliser plant at Amasaman on the
outskirts of Accra. The fertilisers will be a product
of the waste in the dump sites, and is being
developed as a means of recycling to offload the
large quantities of waste on the main dump sites
while providing a useful commodity. The ‘Zheviane
Xinam’ Chemical Industry Group (Zhejiang
Xin’an Chemical Industrial Group), a national hi-
tech company which produces agrochemicals,
organic silicon and fine chemicals, established a
subsidiary agrochemical branch in Kumasi in May
2012.4 The production of fertilisers within Ghana is
likely to become more important as the oil
industry establishes itself. Currently China and
India are competing for oil contracts with promises
of developing fertiliser plants as by-products. 
China does not as yet have significant agri-
business companies operating in the agricultural
sector. However, there are a number of small
Chinese farmers operating within the country.
They generally produce vegetables and cowpeas
for the domestic market and one farmer has
invested in jatropha. Some of these farmers are also
involved in distributing Chinese agricultural
machinery. One of these farmers imports Chinese
machinery but also tractors from Belarus, and he
believes the tractors to be highly robust.5
The main Chinese initiatives in agriculture grow
out of larger commitments to infrastructure
developments. The contracts for these projects
are usually framed in terms of infrastructure and
energy sector developments rather than
agricultural initiatives. The second significant
area in which projects occur is in input supply.
These occur alongside other related interests
outside of the agricultural sector, such as within
the framework of the development of
petrochemical industries and waste disposal.
These projects also often combine high-tech
elements with appropriate technology that
creates affordable technologies for farmers, as in
gravitational irrigation or fertilisers processed
from urban waste.
The main Chinese investments in the
agricultural sector are in the provision of
infrastructure and technical services. These
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mirror other interventions in the broader
economy that focus on the provision of basic
transport, construction and communication
infrastructures (Africa Research Institute 2012).
Thus, Chinese technicians gain experiences and
insights into Ghanaian agriculture, and are able
to influence subsequent developments, and
Chinese companies derive revenues from
infrastructure provisioning. In contrast with
other nations’ provisions of aid, China does not
seek to gain influence over food markets through
market governance (imposition of standards and
control over production linked to specific forms
of market integration) and a value chain
approach, nor establish a niche for Chinese
agricultural and agri-food companies. A second
area of growing investments is in agrochemicals
and inputs, which may be related to interests in
Ghana’s new petroleum resources. Thus, claims
that China is investing in large-scale agriculture
leading to the appropriation of smallholder lands
are unwarranted in the Ghanaian case.
5 Brazilian investments in the agricultural sector 
In contrast with Chinese agricultural
investments, those of Brazil are more focused,
and reflective of the emergence of Brazil as a
global agri-business power. These investments are
articulated in a framework of extending the
successes of Brazilian agriculture into Africa.
However, there is no unitary framework for the
Brazilian success story, but rather a contested one
that attempts to balance two different facets of
Brazilian agriculture: agri-business based on
large-scale plantations and multinational
investments, and the development of smallholder
agriculture linked into agri-business networks
(see Cabral et al., this IDS Bulletin; McCann 2008).
One major intergovernmental programme
initiated in Ghana is the More Food programme,
which in Brazil is a social and economic
development programme targeted at enhancing
smallholder family farms (see Amanor, and
Cabral et al., this IDS Bulletin; Patriota and Pierri
2013). This is linked to a much broader
programme of social protection based on a
Brazilian model that Ghana has signed up to,
which in Ghana has resulted in the Livelihood
Empowerment Against Poverty (LEAP)
Programme and the introduction of school feeding
programmes. This makes provisions for farmers to
gain access to tractors, and creates facilities
within Ghana for the servicing of these tractors.
The Brazilian government has made a loan of
US$98 million available to the government of
Ghana for the acquisition of tractors. The second
phase will include the provision of post-harvest
equipment and dairy feed. It is envisaged that
these tractors would be suitable for farmers
holding 20–60 hectares (in the Ghanaian context
these would be quite wealthy farmers), or for
farmer associations (which are poorly developed
among Ghanaian smallholders). 
Disbursement of tractors is not new in Ghana,
and during the 1970s was one of the ways in which
development resources were used to build political
constitutions of elite farmers. However, in recent
years, as fuel costs have increased and cheap
tractors disappeared, farmers have increasingly
moved to the use of herbicides in clearing land.
The use of herbicides is also promoted by
Embrapa within its programme of low-carbon
farming based on low-till technologies. This is a
scaled-back version of the ProSavana programme,
which is being promoted by Embrapa in
Mozambique based on technologies introduced
into the Cerrado region of Brazil (see Chichava et
al., this IDS Bulletin). However, as yet, there is no
uptake of low-carbon farming in Ghana. While the
More Food programme claims to target
smallholder agriculture may be questioned in the
Ghanaian context, it serves to create demand for
Brazilian technologies, provided they can
withstand Ghanaian environmental conditions – a
problem to which many other makes of tractor
have succumbed. While this programme is only in
its preliminary phase, it will provide a fascinating
test case of how Brazilian social protection
programmes with underlying market interests
transfer into the African environment. Although
in Brazil this establishes synergies between raising
smallholder farm production, creating markets for
smallholder farm production in school feeding
programmes, and creating demands for
agricultural technology industries (Patriota and
Pierri 2013), it is not clear how the linkages
between social protection and agricultural
production will be managed in the Ghanaian case,
given the differing institutional set-ups in the two
countries. The third linkage in the development
synergy is also different since the industrial
beneficiary of increased productivity will be
Brazilian agricultural machinery companies and
not Ghanaian companies. Within the Brazilian
context, civil society organisations and social
movements have been important in articulating
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the demands of smallholders in policy. In contrast
in Ghana, farmer social movements are weak and
many of the dominant NGOs are international
agencies that now work within an agri-business
value chain framework, in which poverty
alleviation is framed in the context of integration
into commercial agri-business markets.
The second key area of technical cooperation
involves Embrapa’s mandate to develop joint
research programmes between institutions.6 In
Africa, it combines this mandate of building
technical capacities and fostering new research
with a commitment to social inclusion, poverty
reduction, and promoting family farming and
sustainable agriculture. Since 2010 Embrapa has
supported the development of joint collaborative
research partnerships. The main forum is the
Africa–Brazil Technical Innovation Market, which
facilitates joint meetings of Brazilian and African
researchers, creates networks through which
researchers in specific research institutions can
build up linkages to fashion joint research
proposals, and puts out a call for joint research
proposals by African and Brazilian researchers. 
To date, two research proposals have been
sponsored between Ghanaian and Brazilian
researchers. The first is concerned with devising
suitable Rhizobium inoculants to enhance
smallholder production of cowpeas, and the
second conerns conserving and domesticating
indigenous mushrooms.7 This type of research
collaboration enables Embrapa to expand its
research repertoire, gain access to new genetic
materials, lay the foundations for the expansion
of Brazilian agri-business into Africa, and create
demand for Brazilian technology and information
services. Such collaborations also expand
research capacities in Ghana, while building up
familiarity with Brazilian approaches. 
The third significant area of technical cooperation
involves the recent expansion of corporate
Brazilian agri-business into agricultural
production and processing in Ghana. In 2007 the
Brazilian government announced plans to offer a
loan of US$260 million to Northern Sugar
Resources (NSR), a Ghana-registered company, for
a sugar cane plantation and ethanol processing
plant in Northern Ghana, through the Brazilian
Development Bank (BNDES). The project
requires a total investment of US$306 million.
The ethanol plant will be built by Constran S/A of
Brazil. The ethanol is designated for export to
Sweden, and Svensk Etanolkemi AB, a Swedish
green fuels company, has committed to purchasing
the first ten years of the plant’s production
(Bizzard 2008; Razanamandranto 2008). It is
estimated that one year after production
commences, ethanol will emerge as Ghana’s fourth
largest export commodity. However, there have
been considerable delays in implementing this
programme, which are partly related to problems
in land tenure transparency and conflicts over land
between rival chiefly interests.
This development takes place in the context of
controversies over Brazilian imports of ethanol
into the EU (Bizzard 2008; Razanamandranto
2008). One method of bypassing the impasse on
European tariffs on Brazilian ethanol imports
has been to set up joint bilateral projects for
ethanol production in an African country, which
is more likely to gain preferential access to EU
markets. The Brazilian companies provide the
technology, and the European investors provide
the funding for locating ethanol production in
African countries and guaranteed markets and
contracts for the product (Bizzard 2008). This
has provoked accusations that the development
of Brazilian ethanol plants in Africa leads to land
grabbing and environmental destruction. 
Another significant area in which Brazilian
companies are making inputs into the Ghanaian
agricultural economy is rice. Several donors are
interested in supporting enhanced rice
production for the domestic market, and some
private initiatives have developed. In the Volta
Region, the Global Agri-Development Company
(GADCO) has initiated a rice production scheme,
which works with smallholder contract farmers to
produce the much-desired perfumed rice for the
Ghanaian market. GADCO is an agrifood
company that operates in West Africa but is
registered in Amsterdam. Its founders are Iggy
Bassi and Taks Abimbala and its Chairman is
Lord Malloch Brown, former Administrator of
the UNDP and also a former UK government
minister at the Foreign and Commonwealth
Office responsible for Africa, Asia and the United
Nations. It has established a nucleus plantation of
1,100 hectares at Fievie (near Sogakope) in the
Volta Region, which makes it the largest rice
producer in West Africa. At present it is working
out a strategy to incorporate smallholders
(Diakité et al. 2012). 
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GADCO seeks to enhance its market efficiency by
working with a number of specialised service
providers, who occupy various niches in the
production, processing and marketing spheres.
This includes Finetrade, who will be responsible
for marketing the rice, Syngenta for agronomy,
YARA for fertilisers, and Agropecuária Foletto, a
Brazilian rice agri-business company, for
producing technical management and access to
Brazilian technology and technology maintenance
within the project (‘the Brazilian African corridor
for technology and management transfer’). The
Forum for Agricultural Research in Africa (FARA)
and the Gates Foundation are also sponsors of the
programme. However, the most significant
funding for the project has come from Germany,
through the KfW Development Bank, which has
supported the purchase of an advanced rice mill
and further integration of smallholders into the
project.8 The KfW is committed to supporting
food value chain approaches in Africa with
integration of outgrowers. Again, rather than any
simple framework of South–South cooperation,
this programme is an example of a complex
integration of global partners seeking to work out
a viable strategy for food chain governance, in
which Brazilian technology and management
come to the fore in the production process. 
6 The political economy of commercial investments
Beyond the contrasting rhetoric of ‘land grabbing’
or ‘South–South solidarity’ lies a more complex
political economy. Examining alternative strategies
pursued by multinational corporations highlights
this. For instance, Cargill, which has moved into
cocoa processing and confectionary interests, now
has a major interest in sugar in Ghana, and is
sponsoring the development of a US$100 million
sugar processing plant in Ghana, in the Tema
Free Zone. This factory will not use local sugar
cane but import sugar in syrup form. According to
Cargill, ‘It was not economically viable to venture
into sugar cane plantations locally, despite the
country’s favourable weather conditions.’9
Although the creation of agriprocessing linkages
in Ghana may displace some farmers, global agri-
business strategies of moving resources around
the world to maximise profit may continue to
compound the marginalisation of Ghanaian
farmers and prevent backward linkages of
agriprocessing into the agricultural sector to be
created for the emergence of a dynamic
agricultural economy. The difficulty of access to
the European Union for Brazilian ethanol mirrors
the problems that Brazil faces in North American
markets – that is an unequal playing field, in
which subsidies keep Brazilian products out, while
Brazil is subject to mounting pressures to open up
its agriculture further to free market forces. This
has led Brazil to articulate South–South
cooperation in a particular form, in support of
domestic Brazilian capital. This articulation has
resonated with many African nations who have
supported the Brazilian stance on subsidies and
intellectual property rights in UN bodies and
other international fora. However, the solutions
created by Brazil – bilateral deals with European
partners to finance expansion of ethanol
production in Africa, for example – go well beyond
any notion of South–South cooperation into
strategic alliances with fractions of European
capital to further processes of global capital
accumulation on African soil (Bizzard 2008). 
Cabral (2010) estimates that one fifth of
Brazilian technical cooperation projects involve
trilateral arrangements involving a Northern
donor. These interests are not necessarily
inimical to the development of African
agriculture of course. Nevertheless, they need to
be debated within a framework that
acknowledges wider issues of what benefits
strategic alliances with Brazilian agri-business
can bring to African countries in their
participation in a global agri-business economy.
Accusations that Brazilian and Chinese agri-
business is engaging in environmentally
destructive activities that displace African
farmers is not free of ulterior motives,
particularly when the same critics fail to subject
the discourses of Western transnational
corporations or EU agricultural policy to the
same level of critical analysis as they do the
policies of emerging powers. This is particularly
the case when these international NGOs work
uncritically to develop corporate responsibility
programmes and food value chain development
in Africa for Western multinational companies
with large plantations in other parts of the world. 
7 Conclusion
China and Brazil are both characterised as
‘emerging’ or ‘rising’ powers. They have both
embraced the concept of South–South cooperation
as informing their movement into the
development sphere in Africa. However, the rapid
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economic growth within these countries, the
extent of their investments within Africa, and the
complexity of linkages into the global framework
of agri-business suggests that the simplistic
framework of South–South cooperation and
development as a ‘new paradigm’ throws little
light on the nature of their investments in Africa,
and may actually mask the current position in the
global economy of these emergent powers. 
China has rapidly emerged as the largest trading
and investment partner in Africa. The structure
of its trade reflects the emergence of a highly
sophisticated manufacturing economy that
imports raw minerals, energy and primary
agricultural commodities and exports
manufactured goods, machinery, information and
communication technologies, and construction.
Trade with many African nations, as in the
Ghanaian case, is highly skewed, with the African
nations suffering large deficits in their trade
balance. In recent years, Chinese investments
within African countries have expanded rapidly,
enabling African nation states to begin to develop
the beginnings of a modern infrastructure that
should attract more investments. China is bold in
its investments, willing to undertake large
investments, but also creates projects that aim to
enable these investments to be rapidly recovered
and repaid. The scale of these investments puts
the lack of OECD aid investments during the
1990s and early 2000s to shame, where the excuse
for not investing was the lack of infrastructure
developed by government, the lack of good
governance, and investment risk. 
Chinese investments within Ghana are largely
concerned with developing infrastructure but
also in gaining access to new oil resources. The
huge expansion of investment in the last five
years is underwritten by the oil resources and
their potential to accumulate capital. Although
the agricultural sector has been identified as a
priority area for Chinese development
cooperation, there have been few agricultural
projects within Ghana so far. These are largely
concerned with expanding infrastructure,
particularly irrigation infrastructure and inputs,
but also provide important technical support to
government agricultural services, without
attempting to impose China’s own agri-business
companies into the control of capital accumulation
and management within agriculture. These
interventions have had a telling effect on the
agricultural economy, and have stimulated
interest in investments in modernising rice
cultivation. The economic interests of China in
infrastructure provision thus enable it to provide
a wide range of infrastructural support services
that are critical to the subsequent development
of agriculture, without seeing these service
provisions as unwanted costs that should be
borne by the government, and without engaging
in the asset stripping of government services.
This enables the rapid development of an
agrarian infrastructure, which has been a major
impasse in the 1990s and early 2000s as Western
donors have demanded conditionalities,
including prior investments in agricultural
infrastructure, before attracting global agri-
business. The rehabilitation of irrigation by
Chinese technicians has also introduced
appropriate techniques that are sustainable and
affordable for smallholder farmers. 
Although China has made a huge impact on the
Ghanaian economy, this is not accompanied by
any vision of or debate on the nature of
transformation. Debates with policymakers often
occur behind closed doors and there is little
attempt to facilitate dialogue between African
and Chinese intellectuals and civil society on
these changes (Guttal 2008). This contrasts with
the 1960s and 1970s when many African
intellectuals of a socialist inclination were
inspired and mobilised by the example of China
as a presumed paragon of equality and self-
reliance, as providing an alternative paradigm to
the US model of international development. The
current lack of open debate results in a level of
mistrust of Chinese intentions among a
Ghanaian public and civil society organisations
that are highly questioning of the motives of its
politicians and political parties, and their use of
development resources.
In contrast with China, Brazil’s impact on overall
external trade in Ghana is modest. Trade is
largely limited to a narrow range of agricultural
commodities and raw materials. Brazilian
investments within the Ghanaian economy are
highly focused on building vertical linkages
between agriculture and agriprocessing, and
building agri-business capacities within Africa to
create a niche for Brazilian technology transfer
and management services and knowledge.
Brazilian development banks are willing to
provide loans to African governments and
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companies to create spaces for Brazilian
technology and management services. These
initiatives belie the simple framework of
South–South cooperation. In several instances
these initiatives involve complex finance
relations with fractions of European capital. This
occurs in the context of fierce competition
between Brazilian and US agri-business, and US
government policies of protecting its agri-
business against Brazil through the use of tariffs
and subsidies, while attempting to pressurise
Brazil into opening its domestic markets to US
companies. The movement of Brazilian agri-
business into Africa constitutes an attempt to
open up new markets outside of the Americas,
and also to gain access to European markets by
building up agri-business capacity. These
initiatives are being supported by, for example,
Swedish, Dutch and German financial
investments in Brazilian agri-business. In
contrast with Chinese interventions, Brazilian
investments follow more closely the agri-business
model of promoting private sector investments,
and linkages between smallholders and agri-
business companies within a value chain
framework. Chinese interventions do not
promote private sector agri-business but focus on
building relations with the agricultural ministry
to enhance technologies for smallholder farmers. 
In contrast with the dominant Western neoliberal
model of integration into agri-business markets,
the Brazilian approach combines the
internationalisation of large-scale Brazilian agri-
business interests with policies based on social
inclusion for smallholders. This does not assume
that integration of smallholders into agri-business
markets will bring about a transformation of rural
poverty, but it develops an alternative framework
of social protection alongside agri-business
expansion. The expansion of Brazilian agri-
business into Africa is not necessarily inimical to
Ghanaian agriculture, particularly if it stimulates
vertical linkages between agriculture,
agriprocessing and agri-business and encourages
domestic production. However, these
developments may also lead to new international
constellations of external agri-business domination. 
There is a need to open up a debate within Africa
on the future of agri-business and the relations
between different types of capital and actors in
this process, and the relationships between these
sectors and different categories of farmers in
bringing about future transformations. The rise
of new financial investments in Africa requires
that Ghanaian policymakers develop a more
discerning approach to agri-business and its
impact on various strands of the agrarian
economy, rather than an uncritical affirmation of
government support to agri-business
developments. This requires a vision of what
various types of technical and development
cooperation can contribute towards the Ghanaian
agrarian economy, and what Ghana can
contribute towards shaping the framework of
South–South cooperation, a comprehensive
political economy of geopolitical developments
within agri-business and technical cooperation,
and an analysis of the types of strategic alliances
that will facilitate and advance the interests of
rural people and the agricultural sector.
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1 K. Kpodo, ‘Ghana Signs $13bn in China Loan
Deals’, Reuters, 22 September 2010, Source:
Arab News, www.arabnews.com/node/355856
(accessed 3 January 2013).
2 Source: www.trademap.org/tm_light/
Bilateral.aspx (accessed 3 January 2013).
3 Source: http://mida.gov.gh/site/?page_id=184
(accessed 29 December 2012).
4 See www.ghanabusinessnews.com/2012/05/12/
chinese-companies-to-set-up-agro-chemical-
industries-in-ghana/ (accessed 29 December
2012) and www.hzindus.gov.cn/en/list.asp?id=20
(accessed 3 January2013).
5 Interview with Mr Mok, a Chinese farmer, at
Techiman, 13 October 2012.
6 Africa–Brazil Technical Innovation Market
website: www.africa-brazil.org.
7 Interview with Erich Schaitza, Brazilian
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Accra, 16 October 2012.
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‘GADCO Announces Investment from AATIF
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and-the-german-government.html (accessed
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9 Source: Ghanaian Times, 19 May 2010, General
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